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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN TROY SPANN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890152 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated 
arson, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
103(l)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to quash the jury which was based on defendant's 
allegation that the prosecutor had exercised a peremptory 
challenge in a racially discriminatory manner? 
2. Was there prosecutorial misconduct at trial that 
constitutes grounds for reversal of defendantr s conviction? 
3. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
support defendant's conviction? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Steven Troy Spann, was charged with 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-103(1) (Supp. 1989) (R. 6). A jury found him guilty as 
charged (R. 55). The trial court sentenced defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for a term of five years to life (R. 61). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Given the issues presented on appeal, a lengthy 
recitation of the facts is not necessary. Conflicting evidence 
was presented at trial. The following evidence supports the 
jury's verdict. 
At approximately 3:20 a.m. on November 16, 1988, an 
intense fire was reported burning in a second floor apartment at 
2800 South Adams in Salt Lake County which had recently been 
rented by Barbara Lee (T. 90-91, 137-47, 156-57, 211-15, 308-09). 
A team of investigators who examined the scene after the fire had 
been extinguished concluded that, based on the nature and burn 
pattern of the fire and evidence that an accelerant had been used 
to start the fire (e.g., the presence oE observable "pour 
patterns" — see State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 
1986)), the fire had been intentionally set (T. 221-272, 282, 
285, 296). The team excluded the possibility of an accidental 
fire (T. 276-77). 
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Nine days prior to the fire, Ms. Lee, who had been 
living with defendant for approximately two years and had borne a 
daughter by him, broke off the relationship with defendant. This 
upset defendant. Lee moved to her father's house which was 
adjacent to defendant's residence. On the day of their break-up, 
Lee heard the windshield on her car being broken, and upon 
investigating, noticed defendant near the car. Shortly 
thereafter, defendant initiated a violent argument with Lee at 
her father's house which resulted in defendant forcibly removing 
the couple's daughter and returning to his residence with her. 
Subsequently, defendant moved all of Lee's possessions out of his 
residence and on to the back porch (T. 309-310, 316, 336-41). 
On November 13, 1988, defendant cracked the recently 
repaired windshield on Lee's car during an argument with her and 
as she attempted to drive away from his apartment. The next day, 
Lee, with the help of a male friend named Randy Brown, retrieved 
her belongings from defendant's porch and began moving into the 
apartment at 2800 South Adams. During the day of November 15, 
defendant visited that apartment and in a conversation with Lee 
discussed the poor security of the apartment (i.e., the locks to 
the door were not particularly secure). On the evening of the 
15th, defendant showed up at Lee's place of employment, a bar. 
Although the sequence of events is not entirely clear after this 
point, Randy Brown, who was also at the bar, noticed defendant 
leave the bar at around 11:00 p.m. Approximately five minutes 
later, Brown went outside to the parking lot and discovered that 
the grill and headlights on his truck had been heavily damaged. 
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Lee later discovered that the taillights on her car, which was 
parked outside the bar, had also been damaged. Sometime after 
Brown had returned to the bar from his trip to the parking lot, 
defendant reappeared at the bar, walked by Brown, and said, "I 
kicked your headlights out." In reference to Lee, defendant said 
to Brown, "So you're Barbara's boyfriend?" When Brown answered 
in the negative and explained that he was just a friend helping 
out Lee, defendant remarked, "Well, I gave up that shit a long 
time ago, anyway." Defendant then left the bar (T. 315-16,. 319-
22, 344-46, 379-82). 
When Lee and Brown left the bar at closing time, Brown 
noticed defendant in the parking lot. Lee drove in her car with 
Brown to a restaurant and then accompanied Brown to his residence 
where she spent the night, due to her fear of defendant (T. 328-
31). 
At approximately 4:15 a.m. on November 16, Karen 
Bateman, an acquaintance of defendant's, answered a knock on her 
door and found defendant there. Defendant told her that he had 
stopped to say goodbye because he was going home (apparently to 
Las Vegas). He then said either "Barbara's apartment is in 
flames," or "I flamed Barbara's apartment." Defendant previously 
had threatened to blow up Lee's car and to burn her house and her 
father's house (T. 389-405, 409, 425-26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant failed to meet the standing 
requirement of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the trial 
court properly rejected his Batson objection and denied his 
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motion to quash. Furthermore, his alternative arguments for 
standing were not raised in the trial court and therefore should 
not be considered for the first time on appeal. However, even if 
standing is assumed, arguendo, the court's denial of defendant's 
motion to quash was proper because defendant failed to present 
any evidence to establish that Vietnamese-Americans are a 
cognizable racial group for purposes of equal protection, fair 
cross-section, or due process analysis. 
Defendant fails to establish that the prosecutorial 
misconduct that occurred in this case constitutes grounds for 
reversal of his conviction. Therefore, the Court should uphold 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
Finally, there was sufficient evidence to support 
defendant's conviction of aggravated arson. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY. 
Before the jury in defendant's case was sworn, 
defendant moved to quash the jury, alleging that under Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1988) ("Cantu I M), the prosecutor had impermissibly 
exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a minority person from 
the jury venire (T. 62-68). Without defining the term 
"minority," defendant argued that "minority [persons] are more 
likely than other members of the citizenry to vote for 
The portion of the transcript relevant to defendant's motion to 
quash is attached to defendant's brief on appeal as "Appendix 1." 
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acquittal," and that the prosecutor had exercised, on racial 
grounds, one of his peremptories to strike a minority from the 
jury panel, Mr. Viet Phung, who apparently was a Vietnamese-
2 
American. The trial court denied defendant's motion on two 
grounds: (1) that the motion was not timely; and (2) that 
defendant failed to show he was a member of a cognizable racial 
group as required by Batson and Cantu I (T. 65, 69). 
On appeal, defendant argues that, because he made a 
prime facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory 
challenge on Mr. Phung in a racially discriminatory manner and 
the prosecutor failed to provide a racially neutral explanation 
for the challenge, the trial court erred in not granting his 
motion to quash. He asserts that his motion was timely and that 
although he and Mr. Phung were not members of the same race, he 
had standing to challenge the prosecutor's allegedly 
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge under the fourteenth 
amendment equal protection analysis of Batson
 f the due process 
analysis of Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality 
opinion), and the sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial 
jury analysis presented in other case law. Each of these claims 
3 
will be dealt with in turn. 
2 
The record is not entirely clear regarding Mr. Phungrs race. 
During voir dire, the court's questioning of him was very limited 
(T. 19). Mr. Phung simply stated that he had graduated from high 
school in Viet Nam and had been a citizen (presumably of the 
United States) for about nine years (T. 19). 
3 
Although the prosecutor responded to defendant's motion (T. 63-
65), that response was not made pursuant to an order of the trial 
court to provide a racially neutral explanation for th€> 
peremptory challenge to Mr. Phung, as is required under Batson 
and Cantu I once the defendant has made out a prima facie case of 
•6-
The State agrees that defendant's "Batson" motion was 
timely.4 His citation to Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16 (Supp. 1989) 
and Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1982) 
(repealed effective July 1, 1990)) support his position that his 
motion, made shortly after the prosecution peremptorily 
challenged Mr. Phung and before the jury was sworn, was timely. 
3 
Cont. discrimination (see fn. 4, infra at 7). The prosecutor 
simply was responding with argument to defendant's motion. 
Therefore, in the event this Court has occasion to do so, the 
prosecutor's argument cannot fairly be construed as a Batson 
"explanation" and should not be evaluated as such. If this Court 
were to determine that, under the circumstances of this case, 
defendant established a prima facie case such that the prosecutor 
should be required to provide a racially neutral explanation for 
his strike of Mr. Phung, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for that purpose. See Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597. However, 
in light of the arguments that follow, the Court should not have 
to reach that question. 
4 
Defendant's motion to quash, which did not ask the court to 
require the prosecutor to provide a racially neutral explanation 
for the peremptory strike of Mr. Phung but instead seemingly 
requested a quashal solely on the basis that the prosecutor had 
stricken a "minority" (T. 62-63), was technically incorrect. See 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595-96 (if the 
defendant meets the burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the prosecution must then come forward with a 
racially neutral reason related to the particular case to be 
tried to explain the challenge). As noted in Cantu I: 
While a single challenge based on race is 
impermissible, People v. Brown, 152 
Ill.App.3d 996, 1001, 106 111.Dec. 91, 94, 
505 N.E.2d 397, 400 (1987), the mere fact 
that the subject of the peremptory strike is 
a minority member does not alone raise the 
inference of discriminatory intent. "[I]t is 
not unconstitutional, without more, to strike 
one or more [Hispanics] from the jury." 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 1725, 90 
L.Ed.2d at 91 (White, J., concurring). 
750 P.2d at 597 (footnotes omitted). However, this deficiency in 
the motion, although perhaps an independent ground for affirming 
the trial court's ruling, becomes relatively insignificant in 
light of the more basic flaws in defendant's motion which are 
discussed infra. 
See State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (section 78-
46-16(1) requires that any challenge to the jury must be lodged 
before the jury is sworn); People v. Harris, 542 N.Y.S.2d 411 
(A.D. 1989) (to be timely, an objection pursuant to Batson must 
be made before the jury, or the last juror including alternates, 
is sworn). 
However, defendant's arguments concerning the merits of 
his motion do not fare as well. First, his claim that Batson can 
be read to allow any criminal defendant to object to a peremptory 
strike of a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable 
racial group without regard to whether the defendant is also a 
member of that cognizable racial group, ignores the plain 
language of Batson. As explained by this Court, under Batson, 
[t]he use of a peremptory challenge solely 
on the basis of race violates equal 
protection. The party attacking a peremptory 
challenge must establish a prima facie case. 
The burden then shifts to the challenged 
party to show the existence of a racially 
neutral reason for the challenge. 
State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II") . And, 
[t]o attack a peremptory challenge under 
Batson, the defendant must establish a prima 
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member 
of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the 
prosecution exercised peremptory challenges 
to remove from the panel members of the 
defendant's race, and (3) that all the 
relevant facts and circumstances raise an 
inference that the prosecution used its 
peremptory challenges to exclude the 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of 
their race. 
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Batson, 
as part of its equal protection analysis under the fourteenth 
amendment, explicitly requires that the defendant establish a 
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prima facie case of discrimination by showing, first, that he or 
she is a member of a cognizable racial group and, second, that 
the prosecutor struck panel members of the defendant's race. 
Thus, contrary to the argument defendant made below and now makes 
on appeal, there must be racial identity between the defendant 
and the subject of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge for the 
defendant to have standing to object to the challenge under 
Batson. In short, to establish an equal protection violation 
under Batson, membership in the excluded group is a threshold 
requirement for the defendant. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94. In Cantu 
JL, this Court obviously recognized this requirement when it 
concluded that the defendant, a Hispanic, had met the first prong 
of Batson by showing that the panel member was also Hispanic. 
750 P.2d at 596. 
Although defendant urges the Court to adopt the 
reasoning of the majority opinion in State v. Superior Court 
(Maricopa County), 156 Ariz. 512, 753 P.2d 1168 (Ariz. App. 
1987), a decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals which 
rejected a reading of Batson that would require that the 
defendant be of the same race as the stricken jurors to have 
standing to object, that reasoning has not been accepted by 
Arizona's highest court, see State v. Superior Court (Maricopa 
County), 157 Ariz. 541, 545, 760 P.2d 541, 545 (Ariz. 1988) (en 
5 
banc), and does not reflect the better reasoned view adopted by 
5 
Recognizing the misinterpretation of Batson by the court of 
appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court, in reviewing that court's 
decision, chose to analyze the standing issue under the fair 
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment, rather than the 
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, and concluded 
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numerous courts and commentators. See, e.g., State v. Gorman, 
315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203, 1209-10 (1989); State v. Superior 
Court, 157 Ariz, at 545 n.2, 760 P.2d at 545 n.2 (citing cases); 
Note, Due Process Limits On Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1018 n.37 (1989) (hereafter Note, 
Peremptory Challenges); Note, Sixth Amendment Reform of 
Peremptory Challenges — State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541, 
760 P.2d 541 (1988) (en banc), 21 Ariz. St. L-J. 327, 333 (1989) 
(hereafter Note, Sixth Amendment Reform of Pejremptory 
Challenges). The major flaw in the majority opinion of the 
Arizona Court of Appeals in State v. Superior Court is its 
unjustified application to Batson of Peters v, Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 
(1972) (plurality opinion), where Justice Marshall and the two 
members of the Court who joined his opinion concluded that a 
white defendant had standing under the Due Process Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to challenge the systematic exclusion of 
blacks from the initial draw for grand and petit juries. Peters, 
unlike Batson, did not involve peremptory challenges and 
therefore cannot reasonably be applied to read out of Batson the 
explicit requirement that the defendant be of the same race as 
the excluded venireman. See State v. Superior: Court, 156 Ariz, 
at 516-17, 753 P.2d at 1172-73 (Shelley, J., dissenting). 
Therefore, under the correct reading of Batson, 
defendant, who was Caucasian (T. 68), did not have standing to 
object to the prosecution's allegedly discriminatory use of a 
Cont. that a Caucasian defendant had standing to object to the 
prosecution's peremptory challenges to strike black veniremen. 
157 Ariz, at 544-46, 760 P.2d at 544-46. 
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peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Phungf who defendant maintains 
was a Vietnamese-American, Insofar as the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion on the ground that defendant failed to show 
he was a member of a cognizable racial group can be interpreted 
as a ruling that defendant and Mr. Phung were not members of the 
same cognizable racial group as required by Batson, it should be 
affirmed. Even if it cannot be so interpreted, the court's 
ruling should be affirmed under the principle that this Court may 
uphold the trial court's ruling on any proper ground. See State 
v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) ("[T]his Court may affirm 
the trial court's decision on any proper grounds, even though the 
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling."). 
In the alternative, defendant argues that this Court, 
pursuant to article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, 
could grant any criminal defendant standing to raise a Batson-
type equal protection objection without regard to whether the 
particular defendant is a member of the same cognizable racial 
group as the excluded venireman. As an initial matter, the Court 
should not address this alternative argument under the state 
constitution on the ground that defendant did not raise the 
argument below. Defendant's argument in the trial court was 
based solely on Batson and Cantu and the federal constitutional 
analysis contained therein. It is well settled that in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, this Court will not review 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
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matters raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Steggell, 
660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). This rule is equally applicable 
to constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989) 
(refusing to address the defendant's due process claim which was 
raised for the first time on appeal); S'cate v., Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 
117 (Utah 1987) (defendant's constitutional claim, raised for the 
first time on appeal, would not be reviewed). And, the principle 
logically applies where the defendant raises a state 
constitutional argument for the first time on appeal. See State 
v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (refusing 
to address the defendant's state constitutional argument which 
was not presented to the trial court) . £f. State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a 
particular [constitutional] ground for suppressing unlawfully 
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not 
consider that ground on appeal). 
The foregoing waiver argument is also applicable to 
defendant's additional arguments regarding due process (citing 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), and article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution), trial by an impartial jury (citing the 
sixth amendment analysis of Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th 
Cir. 1985), on remand, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution; and various state decisions interpreting state 
constitutional provisions designed to insure impartial juries 
through representation of a fair cross-section of the community 
-1?-
on the jury (e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 
Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978)), and state and federal jury 
selection laws (citing 18 U.S.C. § 243 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
46-2 and -3 (1987)). See Br. of Appellant at 15-22. None of 
those arguments was presented to the trial court; therefore, they 
should not be considered by this Court for the first time on 
appeal. 
However, even if the Court were either to accept 
defendant's proposed interpretation of Batson (under which he 
would have standing to raise a Batson objection) or to look past 
the waiver discussed above and assume, arguendo, that a criminal 
defendant, regardless of his or her race, has standing under the 
federal and/or state constitutional guarantees of due process, 
trial by an impartial jury, and equal protection (as argued 
alternatively by defendant) to object to the prosecution's 
7 
allegedly racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, 
Defendant's statutory arguments are effectively subsumed within 
his constitutional arguments, in that the statutes he cites 
merely reflect constitutional guarantees under the federal and 
state constitutions. See Peters, 407 U.S. at 498 (plurality 
opinion), at 506-07 (White, J., concurring) (discussing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 243 and its relationship to the fourteenth amendment). 
Furthermore, with respect to defendant's citations to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-46-2, -3 and -16 (1987 & Supp. 1989), sections of the 
Jury Selection and Service Act, this Court in State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 574 n.115 (Utah 1987), decided that "constitutional 
challenges to [jury] panels should be brought outside the 
framework of the Act." This same reasoning logically applies to 
constitutional challenges to the petit jury selected. 
Also, there are clear divisions in the courts on the due 
process and impartial jury/fair cross-section issues defendant 
raises. A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in 
the Arizona Court of Appeals case of State v. Superior Court, 156 
Ariz, at 514-18, 753 P.2d at 1170-74, well illustrates the 
opposing views on the applicability of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Peters to the peremptory challenge issue the Court 
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the Court would still be obligated to uphold the trial court's 
Cont. later addressed in Batson. Even more distinct is the 
split on the question of whether the impartial jury/fair cross-
section analysis under the sixth amendment is applicable to 
peremptory challenges. Compare, e.g., State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 
402, 554 A.2d 1203, 1210-11 (1989), with Fields v. People, 732 
P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987). See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
456-57 (Utah 1988) (discussing the applicability of sixth 
amendment fair cross-section analysis to peremptory challenges in 
light of Batson and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)). 
That issue may soon be resolved by the Supreme Court in Holland 
v. Illinois, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989) (granting certiorari), where 
the questions presented are: (1) does the State's use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the trial jury 
violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial 
jury; and (2) does a Caucasian defendant have standing to object 
to the exclusion of Blacks from his jury? See Note, Sixth 
Amendment Reform of Peremptory Challenges, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. at 
345. 
Finally, there are serious conceptual problems with 
defendant's suggestion that an equal protection challenge to 
allegedly discriminatory use of peremptories by the prosecution 
is available to a defendant regardless of his or her race. 
"Under equal protection doctrine the right to be tried before a 
jury of one's peers is not so clearly undermined where the 
excluded jurors are not members of the same group as the 
defendant." Fields, 732 P.2d at 1150. As stated by this Court 
in Tillman: 
Although fair cross-section cLaims are in 
certain respects analogous to discrimination 
claims under the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, there are 
significant distinctions which must be 
observed. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 
n.26, 99 S.Ct. at 670 n.26. For example, 
because in sixth amendment challenges the 
focus is on fair cross-sectio.i issues and not 
on the issue of discrimination, a defendant 
is not required to show bad faith, and a 
prima facie showing of systematic exclusion 
may not be rebutted by proof of a 
nondiscriminatory intent. United States v. 
Jenison, 485 F.Supp. 655, 660 (S.D.Fla. 
1979). Additionally, standing exists 
regardless of the race or class of a 
defendant. Duren, 439 U.S. at 359 n.l, 99 
S.Ct. at 666 n.l. 
750 P.2d at 575 n.126. 
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denial of defendant's motion to quash. 
Under all the analyses defendant proffers on appeal, to 
prevail on a claim of racial discrimination the defendant must 
show exclusion of members of a cognizable racial group. See 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (setting out cognizable racial group 
requirement in equal protection context); State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 575 (Utah 1987) ("A prima facie violation of the fair 
cross-section guarantee is established where a defendant shows: 
. . . [T]hat the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" 
group in the community . . . .") (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357, 364 (1979)); Peters, 407 U.S. at 503 (plurality 
opinion) (which talks about exclusion from ju3:y service of "a 
substantial and identifiable class of citizens" in due process 
context). Because each of the three analyses—Batson (equal 
protection), Duren (fair cross-section), and Peters (due 
process)—views peremptories as potentially harmful only if 
exercised to eliminate members of discrete groups, they all 
require proof of cognizability. See Batson, 478 U.S. at 96; 
Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1311 (1989) (recognizing cognizability 
requirement for sixth amendment impartial jury/fair cross-section 
o 
analysis of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); 
o 
See also People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 
902, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978) (which recognized the cognizability 
requirement in holding that, under the representative cross-
section requirements of the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution, peremptory challenges could not be used to exclude 
prospective jurors on the basis of membership in an identifiable 
group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar 
grounds). 
Peters, 407 U.S. at 503. See also Notef Peremptory Challenges, 
102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1019-21 (recognizing and then criticizing 
the cognizability requirement inherent in both equal protection 
q 
and fair cross-section analyses). Accordingly, defendant was 
obligated to establish in the trial court that Mr. Phung, 
apparently a Vietnamese-American, was a member of a cognizable 
racial group. However, he presented no evidence or argument on 
that point to the trial court, apparently assuming that 
Vietnamese-Americans are necessarily a cognizable racial group. 
His arguments on appeal are based on that same, unsupported 
assumption. 
Although "courts have pointedLy disagreed upon the 
proper standard to apply in determining cognizability under 
Batson and have struggled repeatedly in deciding whether a 
particular classification satisfies the cognizability standards," 
Note, Peremptory Challenges, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1020 (footnotes 
omitted), something more than the assumption upon which defendant 
proceeds in the instant case is required. A brief overview of 
the law in this area and this Court's treatment of the 
cognizability issue will illustrate this point. 
This Court first had occasion to address the cognizable 
or distinct group question in a pair of capital murder cases — 
Because defendant does not argue for a different analysis of 
the cognizability requirement under the state constitutional 
provisions he cites, this Court should not consider that issue. 
See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a 
general rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional 
analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the 
state and federal constitutions are briefed."). Accordingly, the 
State will not address it. 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 457 (Utah 1988), and State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 573-77 (Utah 1987). The Court's analysis 
in Tillman was made applicable to both defendemts. Bishop, 753 
P.2d at 457. There, the defendants argued that the panels from 
which their juries were selected did noc contain a fair cross-
section of the community because "using voter registration lists 
as the exclusive source of selecting potential jurors leads to 
the systematic underrepresentation of racial and ethnic 
minorities, particularly Hispanics, on panels in Salt Lake 
County." Tillman, 750 P.2d at 573. In addressing that argument, 
the Court stated: 
The sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees an accused trial by 
an impartial jury. The fourteenth amendment 
to the United States Constitution 
incorporates the sixth amendment's fair trial 
guarantees and makes them applicable to the 
states. The selection of petit juries from a 
representative cross-section of the community 
is an essential component of the sixth 
amendment's right to a jury trial. 
The use of voter registration lists as the 
sole source of obtaining prospective jurors 
is not impermissible absent a showing of some 
impropriety in the process. For example, 
such "impropriety" might be demonstrated if 
those lists resulted in the systematic 
exclusion of a cognizable group or class of 
citizens or if there was discrimination in 
the compilation of such lists. Moreover, 
while jurors must be drawn from a source 
fairly representative of the community, each 
jury need not "mirror" the community: 
"Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any 
particular composition." 
Id. at 574-75 (footnote citations omitted). Noting that one 
component of establishing a prima facie violation of the fair 
cross-section guarantee is "that the group alleged to be excluded 
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is a 'distinctive' group in the community," id. at 575 (citing 
Puren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)), the Court stated: 
Although Bishop claimed that all racial 
and ethnic minorities were excluded from Salt 
Lake County venires, defendants focus on 
appeal upon Hispanics. Bishop contends that 
Hispanics are distinctive because they are 
designated in a separate category in census 
figures and because they are "segregated by 
religion, economic status and cultural 
background from the majority of county 
residents." Similarly, the State would have 
us assume that Hispanics are a distinctive 
group for fair cross-section purposes. We 
believe such an assumption is too hastily 
made. For purposes of the equal protection 
clause, Hispanics may be a distinctive group. 
But it does not necessarily follow that they 
are distinctive in Salt Lake County for fair 
cross-section purposes. 
Bishop relies upon People v. Harris, 
wherein the California Supreme Court found 
that Hispanics were a distinctive group for 
purposes of fair cross-section analysis. 
However, Harris is not persuasive on this 
point. Taylor v. Louisiana and Duren v. 
Missouri note that a particular group must be 
of sufficient numerosity and distinctiveness 
to be cognizable for fair cross-section 
purposes. This standard certainly implies a 
factual determination which turns upon the 
relevant characteristics of the particular 
community. Therefore, although Hispanics may 
be a distinctive group in California for 
purposes of the sixth amendment, it does not 
follow that they constitute such a group in 
Utah. 
Id. at 575-76 (footnotes and footnote citations omitted). The 
Court then concluded that the failure of both Bishop and Tillman 
to offer any evidence to support their claim ichat Hispanics are a 
distinctive group in Salt Lake County was fatal to their sixth 
amendment claim. :id. at 576. For precisely the same reason, 
defendant's sixth amendment argument, although made in a slightly 
different context, must fail. He did not present to the trial 
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court, and does not offer on appeal, any evidence to establish 
that Vietnamese-Americans are a distinctive group in Salt Lake 
County, the location of his trial. See also United States v. 
Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1063 (1988). 
This Court seemingly has taken a somewhat different 
approach with respect to the Batson equal protection analysis 
under the fourteenth amendment. In Tillman, the Court, citing 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954), observed that 
"[f]or purposes of the equal protection clause, Hispanics may be 
a distinctive group." 750 P.2d at 575. However, in a footnote, 
the Court qualified this by adding that M[e]ven the Court in 
Hernandez warned that whether such a group did in fact exist was 
a question of fact in any given community." Ici. at 575 n.125 
(citing Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478). Nevertheless, in Cantu I, 
when confronted directly with the question in the Batson context, 
the Court simply stated, in conclusionary fashion, that 
"Hispanics or Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable racial 
group' for purposes of equal protection analysis under Batson." 
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 596 (footnote omitted) (citing Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); and Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 
(Colo. 1987)). Cf. U.S. v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th 
Cir. 1987) (stating, without discussion, that Native Americans 
are a cognizable racial group). The Court mijp no reference to 
footnote 125 in Tillman, 750 P.2d at 57 5 n.125, where it had 
noted the warning in Hernandez that whether a distinctive group 
actually exists is a question of fact in any {reticular 
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community. Given the Court's general citation to Castaneda, it 
apparently found the following language from that case 
controlling, notwithstanding the Hernandez warning: "[I]t is no 
longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are a clearly 
identifiable class." 430 U.S. at 495 (citing Hernandez). 
However, the Court's additional citation to Fields, the 
Colorado case, is somewhat confusing. En Fields, the issue 
decided by the Colorado Supreme Court was "whether the 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges violated the 
defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury under the sixth 
amendment to the federal constitution and article II, section 16 
of the Colorado Constitution." 732 P.2d at 1151. In holding 
that "Spanish-surnamed people are a cognizable group for purposes 
of determining whether a defendant has been denied the 
opportunity for a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the 
community" and that "a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
systematically to exclude Spanish-surnamed persons from the jury 
deprives a defendant of the right to trial by an impartial jury 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment and . . . the Colorado 
Constitution," id. at 1146, 1153, the court specifically adopted 
the sixth amendment fair cross-section standard for determining 
cognizability that the California Supreme Court set forth in 
People v. Wheeler — i.e., "a group is legally cognizable if it 
is defined on the basis of race, national origin, religion or 
sex." JId. at 1153 & n.15. Therefore, the Cantu I Court's 
reliance on Fields as support for its conclusion that "Hispanics 
or Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable racial group' for 
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equal protection analysis under Batson/' 750 P.2d at r>9t), it both 
misplaced and directly contrary to its footnote in that same case 
where it "reservefd] judgment on whether Hispanics are a 
distinctive group under sixth amendment fair cross-section 
analysis/' id. at 596 n.3 (citing State v. Tillman/ 750 P.2d 546 
(Utah 1987)). 
The absence in Cantu I of a clear statement of the 
standard to be applied in determining cognizability under Batson, 
coupled with the Court's seemingly inconsistent citations to 
Castaneda and Fields, is troublesome. The Cantu II Court's 
subsequent citation to and apparent approval of the elements of a 
prima facie case of bias enunciated in People v. Wheeler -- which 
include "a showing that persons excluded belong to a cognizable 
group under the representative cross-section rule" — compounds 
the problem. See 778 P.2d at 518. This ambiguity in the Court's 
Batson case law requires clarification. 
As previously noted, the courts have pointedly 
disagreed upon the proper standard to apply in determining 
cognizability under Batson. Note, Peremptory Challenges/ 102 
Harv. L. Rev. at 1020. At least one court has borrowed the 
guidelines for sixth amendment analysis developed in Duren v. 
Missouri/ 439 U.S. 357 (1979). See United States v. SgrO/ 816 
F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. I9H7), cert, denied/ 4IU 11 S 11063 (1988). 
In Sgro, the court, in deciding that the defendant had failed to 
demonstrate that "the undefined designation 'persons bearing 
Italian-American surnames,' or even the designation rTldlian-
American' meets the test promulgated by Duren . . . to establish 
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a constitutionally cognizable class/' 816 F.2d at 33 (footnote 
omitted), stated: 
For a defendant to establish a prima facie 
case of purposeful discrimination in the 
selection of the petit jury, based solely on 
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise 
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's 
trial, the defendant first must show that he 
is a member of a cognizable racial group. 
Batsonf 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723; Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482f 492, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 
1279, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). 
Ibid. It further observed: 
[T]he standard that must be met to establish 
that a group is constitutionally cognizable 
is no longer subject to question. See Duren 
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 
668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Barber v. Ponte# 
772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
The proponent must prove that (1) the group 
must be definable and limited by some clearly 
identifiable factor, (2) a common thread of 
attitudes, ideas or experiences must run 
through the group, and (3) there must exist a 
community of interest among the members, such 
that the group's interest caniot be 
adequately represented if the group is 
excluded from the jury selection process. 
Ibid. However, this approach was criticized in United States v. 
Biaggi, 673 F.Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989): 
In order to satisfy the first prong of the 
Batson three-part test, it must be shown that 
Italian-Americans constitute a "cognizable 
racial group." Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. 
The standard for determining cognizability 
for equal protection objections to peremptory 
challenges during jury selection under Batson 
is the one set out in Castenada v. Partida, 
430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1274, 51 
L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), as is clear from the 
Batson Court's direct citatiofi to Castaneda. 
See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. This standard 
defines as cognizable any group that is "a 
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for 
different treatment under the laws, as 
-22-
written or as applied." Castaneda, 430 U.S. 
at 494, 97 S.Ct. at 1274. See also United 
States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (11th 
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, U.S. , 107 
S.Ct. 1973, 95 L.Ed.2d 814 (1987), "(applying 
Castaneda test to Batson analysis). 
The government urges that, instead of 
following Castaneda, the court should adopt 
the reasoning of the First Circuit in United 
States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987), 
which found the evidence insufficient to 
establish that Italian-Americans are a 
"cognizable racial group" under Batson. 
There the First Circuit chose to borrow the 
cognizability standard developed for the 
Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury 
venire represent a fair cross-section of the 
population. See Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33 
(employing the characteristics outlined in 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 
664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), and Barber v. 
Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en 
banc)). The Sgro court's borrowing act is 
initially suspect because the Supreme Court 
in Batson quite clearly commanded that 
Castaneda govern its own use of the term 
"cognizable racial group." See Batson, 106 
S.Ct. at 1723. 
Furthermore, there is an important 
difference between the meaning of 
cognizability in these two different 
contexts. Discrimination against a group in 
the cross-section of the venire, in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment, may be demonstrated 
by mere statistical underrepresentation of 
that group. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26, 
99 S.Ct. at 670 n.26. Discrimination in the 
use of peremptory challenges in violation of 
the equal protection clause, by contrast, 
necessitates a showing of the "essential 
element" of "discriminatory purpose." Id.; 
see Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. Because 
discrimination in the venire under the Sixth 
Amendment may be statistical, the definition 
of a "cognizable group" must be narrowly 
drawn lest any group imaginable by defense 
counsel be found numerically 
underrepresented. See Barber, 772 F.2d at 
999 (en banc) (warning that "blue-collar 
workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, 
and an endless variety of other 
classifications" could receive protection). 
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Because the guarantee against 
discrimination through peremptory challenges 
requires a showing of purposef "cognizable 
racial groups" may be defined less rigidly, 
for it is precisely the evidence of 
intentional exclusion of the group that helps 
to identify the group. The First Circuit 
itself made this distinction clear: 
That is not to say, however, that 
if a classification were speci-
fically and systematically excluded 
from jury duty the same standard 
would be used as here, where defen-
dant simply relies on a statistical 
disparity in the venire to chal-
lenge its constitutionality [under 
the fair cross-section rule]. If 
certain people are specifically and 
systematically excluded from jury 
duty, then the jury-administrating 
authority would have created its 
own group. 
Barber, 772 F.2d at 999-1000 (en banc) 
(emphasis in original). 
673 F.Supp. at 99-100. 
Recognizing, nevertheless, that Sgro's criteria are 
useful, the Biaggi court identified numerous common 
characteristics of Italian-Americans (many of which were 
judicially noticed) and concluded that under those criteria, 
Italian-Americans are a cognizable group. Id., at 100-01. 
Additionally, it concluded that "[alternatively, Italian-
Americans are a 'cognizable racial group' under the less 
restrictive Castaneda standard more properly applied to the 
present Batson inquiry into purposeful discrimination by 
peremptory challenges." ^d. at 101. The court observed that 
"Italian-Americans are 'recognizable' and 'distinct,' and appear 
to have been 'singled out for different treatment under the laws, 
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as written or applied.' •' Ibid, (citing Castaneda/ 430 U.S. at 
494.) 
Sgro and Biaggi illustrate the difficulties that are 
created by the absence of a clear standard in this Court's case 
law for determining cognizability under the equal protection 
analysis of Batson. Although the distinctions between the 
cognizability standard for purposes of fair cross-section 
analysis and the cognizability standard for equal protection 
analysis are perhaps not that pronounced, this Court clearly 
recognized the distinctions in Tillman and emphasized the 
importance of observing them. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575. Thus, 
it is incumbent upon the Court to be more precise as to the 
cognizability standard that is applicable to a Batson challenge 
than it was in Cantu I and Cantu II. For Batson equal protection 
analysis, the Biaggi court appears to be correct in concluding 
that the standard set forth in Castaneda, which was specifically 
cited in Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, is more appropriately applied. 
The State recognizes that the Castaneda test of cognizability is 
less restrictive (and, therefore, more easily met by the 
defendant) than is the Duren test of cognizability. See Tillman, 
750 P.2d at 575-76; Biaggi, 673 F.Supp. at 101. 
With the foregoing in mind, this Court need only 
determine whether defendant has demonstrated that Vietnamese-
Americans are a cognizable racial group for purposes of Batson's 
equal protection analysis. Although it might be argued that 
Vietnamese-Americans are no less cognizable than other racial 
groups who have already been recognized as cognizable for equal 
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protection purposes, defendant has offered nothing to establish 
this fact, either in the trial court or in this Court. Cf. 
Biaggi, 673 F.Supp. at 100-01• He simply assumes that 
Vietnamese-Americans are cognizable. "At the very least, a party 
seeking to invoke Batson must sketch out a fact-based prima facia 
showing of cognizability . . .," Sgro, 816 F,2d at 33, whether 
that be in the Castaneda sense or the Duren sense. In short, 
because defendant entirely failed to meet even this minimal 
burden below, the trial court's order denying his motion was 
proper. See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 260 (Court may uphold 
the trial court's decision on any proper ground). 
To summarize, defendant, who Is white, did not have 
standing under Batson to raise an equal protection challenge to 
an allegedly discriminatory peremptory strike of a prospective 
juror who apparently was a Vietnamese-American. Because 
defendant did not raise in the trial court his alternative 
constitutional arguments in support of his standing claim (i.e., 
the impartial jury/fair cross-section and due process analyses), 
the Court should not consider them for the first time on appeal. 
But, even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that defendant 
has standing under his proposed interpretation of Batson or on 
See, e.g., Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495 (Mexican-Americans are 
cognizable); Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987) (white 
persons constitute a cognizable group), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 
1311 (1989); United States v. Chalan, 8L2 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 
(10th Cir. 1987) (summarily finding American Indians to be a 
cognizable group under Batson). 
For the same reasons, defendant has failed to meet the 
cognizability requirement of Peters's due process analysis, even 
though that requirement was stated in a slightly different manner 
than were similar requirements in Castaneda and Duren. 
or 
one or more of the alternative constitutional bases he offers, 
defendant fails to satisfy the cognizability requirements 
(associated with the excluded group) that are inherent in each 
approach. For all these reasons, the Court should uphold the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to quash. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTION FOR ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor was guilty of 
misconduct that requires reversal of his conviction under the 
authority of State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), or, 
alternatively, under this Court's case law regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct, see, e.g., State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 
185, 187 (Utah 1986). Defendant contends that the prosecutor 
deliberately violated the trial court's order, made during an 
unrecorded side bar conference, that the prosecutor was not to 
question one of the State's witnesses, Grant Hodson, who was the 
landlord at the apartment complex where the fire occurred, about 
whether Hodson was a suspect in the fire. The record is not 
entirely clear as to the basis for the court's ruling on the 
evidence, but the court apparently prohibited inquiry either on 
relevancy grounds (see Utah R. Evid. 401) or on grounds of undue 
12 prejudice (see Utah R. Evid. 403). Nor, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, JS Ihf ,i>?i urd entirely rlear on the 
question of whether the prosecutor deliberately violated the 
The correctness of this ruling is not critical to the 
resolution of the prosecutorial misconduct issue. 
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court's order, in that the prosecutor did express possible 
misunderstanding of the side bar ruling — a statement that was 
not challenged by the court (T. 418-19), What is clear, however, 
is that the prosecutor did violate the court's order restricting 
the scope of the prosecutor's examination of Mr. Hodson (T. 417-
19). 
In arguing for reversal under the circumstances 
presented, defendant first urges the Court to apply the automatic 
reversal rule applied by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Ubaldi, 
462 A.2d at 1005-11. There, the court had before it the 
questions of whether it "should grant a new trial in order to 
deter prosecutorial misconduct which deliberately circumvents 
trial court rulings and, if so, whether such authority should be 
exercised in the circumstances presented." 462 A.2d at 1008. 
Specifically, the prosecutor, in closing argument, had commented 
on the defendant's failure to produce a witness who could not be 
called to testify because the court had earlier ruled that the 
witness had validly invoked his fifth amendment right to remain 
silent. Ixl. at 1010. The prosecutor's reference to the witness 
obviously "implied an association of the defendant with a person 
who had been identified as a 'bookie,'" which, in the context of 
the case, was highly prejudicial to the defendant. Ibid. The 
court noted: 
The prosecutor's argument to the jury was 
improper both because the inference sought 
was clearly impermissible and because it 
demonstrated a complete disregard for the 
tribunal's rulings. The record of the 
proceedings affords no reasonable inference 
that the remark of an experienced prosecutor 
was inadvertent . . . . 
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Id. at 1007. Recognizing that "[ujpsetting a criminal conviction 
is a drastic step, but . . . is the only feasible deterrent to 
flagrant prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial court 
ruling," id. at 1009 (emphasis added), the court declined to 
apply the usual prejudice/fair trial standard of review for 
prosecutorial misconduct and, under the particular circumstances 
presented, applied a deterrence-oriented automatic reversal rule 
to the case at bar. Id., at 1006, 1009-10. In reaching its 
decision, the court noted the following important factors: 
The trial court did not rebuke or admonish 
the prosecutor upon the defendant's objection 
to the improper argument. The trial court's 
general charge to the jury which included the 
standard instruction relating to the state's 
burden of proof and the defendant's right to 
remain silent, cannot reasonably be viewed as 
obviating the harmfulness of the prosecutor's 
remarks. Nor [was] the failure of the 
defendant to request a curative instruction 
in addition to a mistrial . . . fatal to his 
claim where deliberate prosecutorial 
misconduct was met by the trial court's 
silence in response to a proper objection 
during summation. 
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted). It concluded by stating: 
Where a prosecutor in argument interjects 
remarks deliberately intended to undermine 
the ruling of the trial court to the 
prejudice of the defendant, his conduct is so 
offensive to the sound administration of 
justice that only a new trial can effectively 
prevent such assault on the integrity of the 
tribunal. 
Id. at 1011. 
In many respects the Ubaldi reasoning is quite 
appealing. However, its approacl I is conti: ary to the approach 
traditionally taken by this Court in addressing prosecutorial 
misconduct claims, which require a showing of prejudice when 
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misconduct is established. See, e.g.# State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 
445, 447 (Utah 1989); State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Utah 
1989); State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988). 
Although some of this Court's decisions could be read as 
suggesting that a different standard might apply to intentional 
prosecutorial misconduct, see, e.g., State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 
313, 316 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1981)), the Court's opinion in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1984), appears to indicate otherwise. In Troy, the prosecutorial 
misconduct was plainly characterized as intentional, yet the 
Court applied the traditional prejudice test before deciding to 
reverse the defendant's conviction. 683 P.2d at 486-87. It may 
be that this Court has implicitly adopted the view that "society 
should not bear the burden of a new trial because of 
prosecutorial misconduct where a new trial is not . . . mandated" 
by sufficient prejudice to the defendant and that "the evil of 
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately combatted through 
contempt sanctions, disciplinary boards or other means." Ubaldi, 
462 A.2d at 1009 (discussing position and authorities contrary to 
the position adopted by the court). 
In any event, whether this Court should follow Ubaldi 
if presented with facts similar to those presented there need not 
be decided in the context of the instant case. The flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct, coupled with inadequate court response, 
present in Ubaldi simply does not exist in defendant's case. 
Although defendant doubts the prosecutor's sincerity, the 
prosecutor, apparently to the satisfaction of the trial court, 
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maintained that his violation of the court's ruling was not 
intentional (T. 419). Furthermore, the court here, unlike the 
trial court in Ubaldi, took prompt ameliorative action by 
sustaining defendant's objection to the improper question posed 
to Mr. Hudson and striking Hodson's answer with an admonition to 
the jury to disregard it (T. 414). See Tuckerf 709 P.2d at 316. 
Indeed, the court noted its ameliorative actions in denying 
defendant's motion for a mistrial (T. 417). Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, after the mistrial was denied, defendant's 
counsel asked Mr. Hodson the following question on cross-
examination: "Mr. Hodson, you've never been questioned as a 
suspect in this fire, have you?" (T. 422-23.) That question, 
although not as direct as the prosecutor's "Did you start that 
fire?" (T. 414), plainly explores the very same subject matter 
that defendant argues the prosecutor impermissibly inquired into 
in flagrant violation of the court's ruling. Given this, 
defendant is not in a position to claim reversible error under 
either the Ubaldi standard or the standard of review 
traditionally applied by this Court. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 
560-61. 
The foregoing discussion effectively disposes of 
defendant's alternative argument that "under traditional 
analysis, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
appellaj * • >t ion foj a mistrial based on the prosecutor's 
misconduct." Br. of Appellant at 34-35 (footnote omitted). In 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988), this Court said: 
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct, we must determine if the 
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prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to the 
attention of the jurors matters they would 
not be justified in considering in reaching 
the verdict and, if so, whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so 
prejudiced the jury that there would have 
been a more favorable result absent the 
misconduct. State v. Tillman, P.2d , 
72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Dec. 22, 1987); State v. 
Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 36 (Utah 1984). In 
determining whether a remark or question by 
the prosecution had such an effect, the 
alleged misconduct must be viewed in light of 
the totality of the trial. No one is in a 
more advantageous position to view the 
incident in the context of the trial than the 
trial judge; therefore, his ruling on whether 
the conduct of the prosecution warranted a 
mistrial will not be overturned absent an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Hodges, 30 
Utah 2d 367, 370 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). 
750 P.2d at 190. In the context of the entire trial, the 
prosecutor's question which is challenged by defendant was not 
that significant. Any prejudice it may have created for 
defendant was significantly diminished by defense counsel's 
questioning of Mr. Hodson on the same subject matter. And, as 
discussed in Point III of this brief, there was substantial 
evidence of defendant's guilt, which lessened the possibility 
that the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's misconduct. See 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 ("If proof of defendant's guilt is 
strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial.") (quoting State v. Seeger, 4 Or.App. 336, 479 P.2d 
240 (1971)). Finally, the prompt ameliorative actions by the 
court upon defendant's objection further obviated any harm that 
might have resulted to defendant. See Tucker, 709 P.2d at 316. 
Accordingly, under the abuse of discretion standard enunciated in 
Speer7 the court's denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial 
should be upheld. 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to support the jury's findings that an arson was 
committed and that defendant committed it. 
In State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court set out the well established standard for appellate 
review of the sufficiency of evidence to suppor t a jury verdict 
in a criminal case. It stated: 
[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evi-
dence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently incon-
clusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . .M . . . 
So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . . 
709 P.2d at 345 (citations omitted). Add i tiona] 1 y, on 
conflicting evidence, the Court is obliged to accept that version 
of the facts which supports the verdict; the existence of 
contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not 
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 
91, 97 (Utah 1982). "Nor is it [the Court's] function to 
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determine guilt or innocence or the . . . credibility of 
conflicting evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom." State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
Circumstantial evidence alone may support a conviction. State v, 
Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986) (upholding arson 
convictions). 
When the evidence presented at trial in support of 
defendant's conviction (as summarized i:.i this brief's statement 
of facts) is viewed in light of the foregoing standards, it 
clearly was legally sufficient, even though primarily 
circumstantial. Defendant's attack on the sufficiency of the 
evidence is little more than a request that this Court ignore 
substantial direct and circumstantial evidence that supports his 
conviction and instead to accept his speculation as to what 
occurred on the night of the crime. Clearly, that is not the 
function of this Court in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. ^J-Jh~~ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this II day of January, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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